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the metaphysical tradition and of a more sophisticated conception of God. 
For the Milesian School, nature was something alive and divine. Although 
in their alternative to the mythical approach to reality there are some signs 
of atheist naturalism, they can also be seen as those who first proposed the 
theistic metaphysical concept of God. The beginning of the rational tradi­
tion, far from disposing entirely with the concept of God, was strongly 
based on it. So, belief in God does not need to be taken as contradictory 
to the pursuit of scientific discovery. In many cases and for many people, 
including important scientists in the past and present, it can actually be a 
meaningful pre-condition.
In short books with ambitious aims, missing points like the ones indicated 
above are almost inevitable. This flaw is well counter-balanced by a provoca­
tive, enjoyable style of presenting the ideas, and a good overview of the main 
atheistic arguments. In a book of philosophy, an engaging tone is generally 
an important quality. Like all short introductions, Baggini's book runs the 
risk of treating its subject superficially. This is not a defect when it assumes its 
role of being just a starting point for the discussion of a controversial theme. 
The problem is that atheism is not subjected by him to any questioning in 
its own right, as if it were immune to numerous criticisms that have been 
made to it. In other words, it is doubtful whether this kind of introductory 
text should be designed as a sort of intellectual defence artillery for atheists 
(or for religious believers). A more neutral approach, dedicated to showing 
the pros and cons of the debate involving atheism, would be more adequate. 
Although it is not contrary to the alleged open-mindedness of the atheis­
tic position defended by Baggini, the apologetic approach chosen sounds 
a little strange, if not naive, and smacks a bit of advertising in many parts. 
Considering theoretical debate the main function of a book of philosophy 
(even a short one), and given the non-fundamentalist perspective adopted 
by the author, this work should be recommended to the religious believer as 
a means of fine-tuning his own beliefs in view of other perspectives, rather 
than as a handbook to help the atheist maintain peace of mind.
Rethinking H um an Nature: A  Christian M aterialist A lternative to the Soul, by 
Kevin J. Corcoran. Baker Academic, 2006. Pp. 152. $18.99 (paperback).
DAVID VANDER LAAN, Westmont College
Rethinking H um an N ature is an effort to bring the constitution view of per­
sons to an audience of philosophy and theology students, as well as lay- 
people who are eager for an intellectual workout. The constitution view, 
Corcoran argues, is a viable middle ground between dualism and what 
he calls "nothing-but" materialism, combining in one view the theses that 
human persons are not merely bodies and that humans are entirely ma­
terial creatures. Throughout, Corcoran argues that the constitution view 
is consistent with essential Christian beliefs and that where it parts com­
pany with the bulk of the Christian tradition, the tradition's error can be 
explained and the departure can be defended. As a book that brings a
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metaphysically sophisticated theory of human nature to a broad audience, 
it occupies a useful niche.
The book is friendly in tone and generous in its consideration of alter­
native views. Without oversimplifying, it concisely engages the dominant 
positions on the mind/body problem and argues for the constitution view. 
Corcoran is a model of humility. When he takes up the topic of substance 
dualism, for example, Corcoran goes out of his way to insist that the ar­
guments of dualists deserve a hearing, and that dualism is in no way in­
tellectually substandard. This even-handed spirit of charitable critique 
pervades the book.
Dualism is the topic of the first chapter, which discusses the substance 
dualism of Plato and Descartes, the compound dualism of Aquinas, and 
William Hasker's emergent dualism. This will be familiar territory for phi­
losophers, and will serve as a fine overview for students. It is Aquinas's 
view that receives the harshest assessment. Corcoran judges it to be inco­
herent, despite Eleonore Stump's defense. Corcoran finds Hasker's emer­
gent dualism to be a somewhat puzzling but nonetheless coherent view, 
though not one which solves problems unsolved by the constitution view. 
The assessment of substance dualism focuses on dubious premises of 
various arguments for dualism, especially Descartes's. Corcoran does not 
think that the usual arguments against substance dualism are compelling, 
so his account of these is very brief.
The second chapter is a critique of a reductionistic "nothing-but" mate­
rialism that identifies the human person either with a biological organism 
(animalism) or the matter that composes it. Corcoran explains the difficulties 
of accounting for persistence across time and explaining consciousness. The 
chief objection, however, rests on the intuition that persons are essentially 
persons, where a person is understood to be an entity capable of conscious 
experience. Suppose a mad surgeon were to remove your cerebral cortex, 
leaving a respirating, metabolizing, unthinking shell. Could such a remain­
der possibly be you? Corcoran is convinced that it could not. The animalist, 
though, is committed to this possibility, since it is apparently possible for a 
human organism to persist through the loss of the cerebral cortex.
The constitution view is explained in the third chapter. On this view, a 
piece of paper may constitute a dollar bill without being identical to it. The 
paper and the bill are distinct objects because they have different histories 
and potentialities. The paper could come to have a uniform shade of blue, 
say, though the bill could not. Applied to human beings, the idea is that 
a body constitutes a person without being a person. A body sometimes 
survives changes a person cannot, and, as the following chapter makes 
clear, the body exists before the essentially-capable-of-consciousness per­
son comes to be. Thus the person is wholly material without being identi­
cal to a human body.
Theologically, Corcoran observes, we may want to point out that hu­
mans are essentially relational. This fits his account well, he says, since 
the constitution view characterizes persons as having first-person per­
spectives. A social and linguistic environment is causally necessary for 
the formation of a first-person perspective, and so relatedness is needed 
both for personhood and for being the particular kind of person one is. It 
is not clear from Corcoran's discussion why the dualist or "nothing-but"
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materialist could not affirm the relatedness of human persons in just the 
same way, though, so his comment that the constitution view is preferable 
to other views overreaches.
Corcoran argues that most of the common philosophical objections to 
the constitution view dissolve on careful consideration. He grants that it is 
counterintuitive that distinct physical objects can occupy exactly the same 
space at the same time, but opines that the positive considerations for the 
view outweigh the worry. Here he also addresses objections based on the 
doctrine of the incarnation and the notion of the imago dei.
Corcoran devotes his longest chapter to stem cell research, cloning, and 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, topics he sees as potential stumbling 
blocks for much of his intended audience. The chapter begins with an ar­
gument that neither materialism nor dualism entails or precludes an ethic 
of life. These metaphysical views must be supplemented with moral prin­
ciples if they are to yield conclusions about the controversial issues that 
surround the beginning of life.
The matter concerns Corcoran since on his view an early term fetus is 
not and does not constitute a person. Even the human organism that will 
come to constitute a person does not begin to exist until thirteen days after 
fertilization, at an early estimate. Until that point the dividing cells of the 
morula and later the blastocyst are a collection rather than an individual 
object. One might fear that such a view implies that we have no ethical 
obligation to preserve these early products of fertilization.
But the constitution view has no such implication, Corcoran argues. 
The biblical themes of creation, incarnation, and resurrection are an en­
thusiastic declaration of the value of the material world, and so they pro­
vide Christians with good reason to preserve early products of fertiliza­
tion even if they are not persons or human organisms. The doctrine of 
the incarnation in particular gives us prim a fa c ie  reason to hold prenatal 
life in high regard. Corcoran draws on these biblical themes in a variety 
of ways, concluding that human embryos should be created only if they 
are intended for implantation. Hence embryos should not be created for 
stem cell research that will eventually destroy them, and in vitro fertiliza­
tion can be used to create multiple embryos only if the parents are willing 
to implant all the embryos so created. On the other hand, non-embryonic 
stem cell research is permissible or even obligatory; the doctrines of in­
carnation and resurrection push us to seek the consummation of God's 
kingdom of healing and wholeness. The discussion includes a thorough 
and helpful introduction to the early stages of embryonic development, 
which Corcoran treats with a metaphysician's eye for questions of persis­
tence and unity.
The chapter's greatest weakness is the somewhat tenuous connection 
between its motivating theology and its ethical conclusions. Creation, in­
carnation, and resurrection are centrally important themes for Christian 
thinking about materiality and embodiment. Corcoran's non-trivial en­
gagement with them is laudable. But the notion that human reproduction 
ought to mirror the giving character of divine creation, for example, itself 
needs to be supplemented in order to yield the result that it is morally 
impermissible to create more embryos than are intended for implantation. 
Might not the creation of surplus embryos be a way of giving, a means
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for increasing the likelihood of a successful pregnancy? If a blastocyst 
is not a person, why not use it to help ensure that a full-fledged person 
will come to be? Even if the theological arguments are only suggestive, 
though, Corcoran has succeeded in illustrating how a materialist with sol­
idly Christian intuitions may be a principled defender of prenatal life.
The fifth chapter canvasses the recent philosophical discussion about 
resurrection. Materialists have faced the puzzle of how a resurrected per­
son can be identical to a person who once died, given that the corpse de­
cays and disintegrates. Corcoran says it is plausible that dualists are no 
better off than materialists, though, since they must account for how the 
resurrection body can be the same body as that which died. Many early 
and medieval Christians, though they were dualists, wrestled with this 
very problem. Indeed, Corcoran suggests, having the same body again is 
what makes it a resurrection as opposed to a reincarnation.
Historically, the most common solution was a reassembly view. Though 
he offers some promising replies to the standard objections, Corcoran ul­
timately rejects this view because it includes no immanent causal relation 
between stages of a person's life. So he explores two other possibilities: 
gappy existence (i.e., death followed by nonexistence and then resurrec­
tion) and non-gappy survival (via fissioning as described below). Corcoran 
argues that each is logically consistent with the requirement of an imma­
nent causal relation, so that the materialist has several ways of understand­
ing the possibility of resurrection.
The final chapter aims to show that the constitution view is consistent 
with the teaching of the Bible. Corcoran places a refreshing emphasis on 
the need for holistic interpretation of the Scriptures rather than an ap­
proach centered on a few proof texts, though he does take time to consider 
of number of specific passages that appear to imply or presuppose a du- 
alistic anthropology.
Both the Old and the New Testaments, Corcoran argues, are consistent 
with the idea of an em bodied  existence between death and resurrection. 
At the moment of death the matter of the body would fission, producing 
both the corpse and, elsewhere, the matter that constitutes a living body, 
the same body that existed before death. Later the body would be glori­
fied in the general resurrection. This accommodates an intermediate (i.e., 
postmortem and pre-resurrection) state of consciousness, which Corcoran 
believes to be taught by Scripture. The idea of intermediate embodiment is 
typically overlooked, Corcoran observes. John Cooper, for example, con­
siders only three resurrection possibilities: immediate resurrection, non- 
existence/re-creation, and the dualistic disembodiment/re-embodiment.
Corcoran takes Jesus' resurrection to be paradigmatic of human resur­
rection generally. For the intermediate embodiment view, this raises the 
question how Jesus could have a living, intermediate body if his body was 
also lying lifeless in the tomb. Corcoran sensibly replies that it was Jesus' 
corpse which occupied the tomb while his intermediate body was active 
elsewhere. However, Corcoran does not address the further question of 
what happened to the corpse before the discovery of the empty tomb on 
Easter morning. No doubt a story could be told. The corpse was stolen af­
ter all, or else it miraculously evaporated. But the latter would be an ad hoc 
appendage to a story that is already, in Corcoran's phrase, "a whopper."
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It is also worth noting that on the intermediate embodiment view a "res­
urrection" is the glorification of an already existing and living body. In 
no sense is it a rising from the grave. This is ironic given Corcoran's sug­
gestion that contemporary dualists have neglected or misunderstood the 
meaning of 'resurrection.'
One of the principal ideas of the chapter is that the biblical case for du­
alism is not as straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. That is a point 
well worth making. Though a dualist interpretation can be defended, the 
anthropological teaching of the text (if any) is not entirely explicit. But it 
is also true that the materialist alternatives, and the intermediate embodi­
ment view in particular, face some serious challenges.
Overall, Rethinking H um an N ature is an excellent entry to current Chris­
tian reflection on the relation between mind and body, as well as the sur­
rounding ethical and theological issues. It engages the reader, succinctly 
covers a wide range of arguments, and exemplifies thoughtful and care­
ful reflection from a thoroughly Christian perspective. Corcoran does not 
pretend that all readers will be convinced by the case for the constitution 
view, but he offers his audience an appealing invitation to take it serious­
ly. For many students and non-specialists, Rethinking H um an N ature will 
be the best available introduction to an important facet of contemporary 
thinking on mind and body.
Providence, Evil and the Openness o f  God, by William Hasker. Routledge, 
2004. Pp. 224. $130 (hardback).
DOLORES G. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame
"How does God run the world?" How can we account for "the prevalence 
of evil in a world supposedly governed by a God who is wise, good, and 
powerful?" (p. 1) In Providence, Evil and the Openness o f  God, William Hasker 
offers a series of reflections based largely upon these questions. Each chap­
ter of this volume is a stand-alone essay, though all are united by one cen­
tral theme: the superiority of open theism over rival conceptions of divine 
providence with respect to both the problem of evil and the existence of 
libertarian free will.
This volume is divided into two parts. The five essays in Part One com­
prise a discussion of the problem of evil; these essays deal very little with 
the differences among competing accounts of divine providence, but focus 
instead on the beliefs shared by most traditional theists. Hasker spends al­
most no time on the logical problem of evil, referring the reader to Alvin 
Plantinga's Free-Will Defense. Instead, the focus here is on the evidential 
problem of evil, "the version which claims that God's existence is improb­
able given the evidence of evil." (p. 24)
Prior to the discussion of the evidential problem, however, is an essay 
pertaining to the existential problem of evil. This version of the problem is 
articulated in the form of moral protest against a God who would create a 
world in which suffering is prevalent. In chapter one, "On regretting the
